The impact of heterogeneous Bilateral Investment Treaties on FDI inflows to a country has been taken into consideration in the world. However, in our perception, only until Bellak and Chaisse (2011), the solution for a BIT index construction could be successfully dealt with. Furthermore, for such a developing country as Vietnam, we couldn't find any previous research regarding this topic. To narrow the gap, we do build up our BIT index for Vietnam basing on the methodology raised by Bellak and Chaisse (2011) 
Introduction
As a part of International Investment Agreements (IIAs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) are of countries' most interested and popular investment agreements.
According to World Investment Report 2013 made by United Nation Conference on
Trade and Development, there have been 2857 BITs in the word by the end of 2012 and each country has signed at least one BIT. In Asia, there are 1194 IIAs involving at least one Asian country which represents almost half of the world total. 3 However, such important role of BIT and key provisions of these treaties are controversial. Guerin S. (2011) has showed that joining BITs leads to 35% increase in FDI inflows from European Union to developing countries. In their researches, Busse, M. et. al. (2008) , Egger, P. and Pfafferamayr, M. (2004) , Neumayer, E. và Spess, L. (2005) and Salacuse, J. and Sullivan, N. (2004) To be more ambitious, we hope to consider the effect of heterogenous BIT on FDI. Our target comes from the fact that despite being based on available forms of regulations, BITs are still different from each other to some extent, making it less or more favorable among them.
Although the question regards heterogeneous BITs and their impacts on FDI is quite interesting, in our perception, there has been no research focusing on the impact of BITs, especially no detailed and focused analysis of BITs' key provisions on FDI inflows to Vietnam. In our research, we expect to narrow the gap for such impact (BITs and BITs' key provisions on FDI inflows). 
Source: UNCTAD Online-Statistic Database
To narrow the gap, we do research on the effect of heterogeneous BITs on FDI inflows to Vietnam for a large sample covering 71 partners for the period from 1995 to 2012 and affirms that signing BIT does help the country to attract more FDI and more favorable BITs lead to higher FDI. This effect is even larger as sub-samples of partners (i) having BITs with Vietnam (all members), (ii) having BITs during the period of 1995-2012 (new members) and (iii) having BITs before the period of 1995-2012 (old members) . More over, we also find out that among 11 articles, the three including Definition of Investment, Admission vs. Establishment and National Treatment do positively affect FDI investors once they become more favorable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 regards the data. Next section is about the empirical strategies. Section 4 shows the main results and robustness checks. The final section is the conclusion. 
Literature review

Do BITs positively or negatively affect FDI?
Despite the enormous number of signed BITs among countries across time, the real effect of these treaties on FDI is still questionable. On the one hand, studies of many authors support the positive impact of BITs. In particular, Busse (2010) , applying a gravity model with instrument approach, has shown that BITs do help to push up FDI inflows to developing countries and BITs even substitute for week domestic institutions.
According to Neumayer and Spress (2005) , a larger number of BITs leads to the higher FDI inflows to developing countries. These authors also show the evidence of BITs as a substitute for a favorable local business environment. In his recent research, Bellak (1) 4 See for instance the rise of investment claims against Asian states find no significant effect of BITs on FDI except for the case of low level political risk.
Tobin and Rose Ackerman (2011) add that it's the surge in BITs weakening the role of the treaties as a tool for FDI attraction to a specific country. In his study using Meta methodology, Bellak (2013) shows that the marginal effect of a single BIT diminishes as the number of BITs goes up, causing low or statistically insignificant effect sizes.
Moreover, Aisbett (2009) explains for the finding that the BIT impact is not observed empirically. The argument comes from the absent commitment effect of BIT originating 5 Kerner (2009) defines signaling in the case of BITs and FDI to be sending a broadly received signal that a country is trustworthy. This will update the investors' belief about the reduction of information asymmetry once BITs are signed or ratified. 6 For further clarification, we think that BITs not only provide protection, but also it makes contribution to institutional quality as well. From the investors' perspective, BITs protect investors especially in the cases of weak institutional quality. This point is supported by Busse et. al. (2008) . In addition to this, in our points of view, from host countries' perspective, BITs do play the role of institutional quality itself as it also contributes to the improving policy framework of the country.. from the given government behavior, repeated games between investors and governments, reputation effects. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) Hallward-Driemeier (2003) , the nature of commitment through which BITs affect FDI depends on the terms included in these agreements. The author points out the attention of researchers to be put just on the existence of BITs, but not much on the strengths of clauses, such as property rights.
Moreover, Busse (2010) indicates the more binding trend of BITs and recent agreements seem to be more effective than the older ones in attracting FDI inflows. In his study, Bellak (2013) states about the lack of earlier literature about BITs' heterogeneity, hence the information behind the average effect will not make much sense for policy maker. He indicates the trend that investor care more about the quality of BITs in their location decisions, hence it is important to do researches about the quality, rather than quantity How can the dissimilarity of BITs' levels of liberalization and protection be measured?
Developing BIT index from the basic dummy variable with 0 and 1, researchers have tried to quantitatively account for the heterogeneity of BITs. However, given the perception of heterogeneous BITs, the measurement for these is still unsatisfied until Bellak and Chaisse (2011) . According to Jang (2011) , there is no previous study before his research to create an index of BIT (in spite of the proliferation of that for regional trade agreements 8 ). He makes an improvement in constructing a BIT index. However, what he has done is just scoring provisions on subjective choice and then taking simple average. BIT selection index which is on the way of setting up by Bellak and Chaisse (2011) is among the most updated and of interest because at first it covers a relatively wide range of main provisions in BITs (11 provisions). Moreover, unlike the subjectively appointing values to clauses, the authors consider weights for each of the provisions by applying factor analysis. This is considered a big progress in BIT index construction.
How about researches about Vietnam?
In our perception, until now, there are few papers to consider the impact of BITs on FDI. That effect is somehow taken into consideration as a supplement for other main results. Cao (2013) as looking into the impact of Vietnam's WTO membership on FDI presents the effect of BITs. She finds the positive influence of BITs between Vietnam and its partners on FDI. However, the variable of BIT is just a dummy, which couldn't help to clarify the difference in the levels of liberalization and protection of BITs. So far we couldn't find any paper constructing a BIT index for Vietnam.
Data
BIT index
The process of BIT index construction includes 2 main parts of (i) coding each article of BIT and (ii) applying Principal Component analysis to obtain the final index.
At first, for coding articles, we take into consideration the suggested main ones from Bellak and Chaisse (2011) After the phase of coding articles, the methodology of Principal Component analysis (PCA) 10 has been applied. The brief methodology analysis is considered in Appendix 2. The rationale for using this method is that we could find out the different components, each of which contains the underlying information about how it can explain the change in variables of articles (variance). Or in another way of interpretation, we could say about the composition of different variables (weights) in each component.
Based on the value of eigenvalue (which is bigger than 1 with 5 components) across components shown in Figure 2 , we decided to select 5 components for our data analyses. Table 3 demonstrates that the variations of our 10 articles in the sample (except Article 4 of Most Favored Nation) are explained largely of more than 50% by our 5 components (the value of "unexplained value" is small than 0.5 for all articles). With the exact values for these 5 components (ranging from -1 to 1) provided by PCA representing 5 types of weights, we take the simple average to have our one value of weight (initial BIT index). Finally, we rescale our values to get the final BIT index ranging from slightly above 0 11 to 1. The higher value of BIT index implies the more favorable conditions for investors. 
Other variables
This section discusses briefly about the data to construct the sample with the range from 1995 to 2012. 
Crisis data: From the banking crisis of Laeven and Valencia (2012), the dummy
Crisis it is constructed with the value of one from the year that country i is affected by the banking crisis until it is not affected anymore. The value is equal to zero otherwise.
Openness data (WTO membership, Openness and ASEAN membership): Data
for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership is constructed using the official information from WTO website. WTO it and WTO vnt are two dummies which are equal to one since the year of country i/Vietnam's becoming WTO member and zero otherwise.
Yearly data for openness (Open it and Open vnt ) is collected from the Penn World 
Empirical strategies
The gravity model is applied to consider the impact of heterogeneous BIT on FDI inflows to Vietnam. The main empirical specification for random effect model for panel data is as follows:
where i denotes country i, vn denotes Vietnam, t is year t.
LogFDI ivnt is the FDI inflow from country i to Vietnam in year t;
BITindex ivnt is a constructed index variable, denoting the value appointed to a BIT between country i and Vietnam at year t; W ivnt is a vector including the following variables:
• Crisis it /Crisis vnt is a dummy variable which is equal to one if country i/Vietnam is affected from a banking crisis in year t and zero otherwise.
14 13 Including time dummies is necessary for the data. This is affirmed by the test results in Appendix 3, Table 11 . 14 Laeven and Valencia (2012) consider a country being affected by a banking crisis when two conditions are met. (i) There exist significantly negative changes in the banking system (such as loss, reduction in liability) and (ii) The government has important banking policy intervention in response to the above negative changes in the system. Based on these two conditions, Vietnam is only regarded by Laeven and Valencia (2012) to be affected by banking crisis in 1997, but not 2008.
• Wto it /WTO vnt is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if country i/Vietnam is a GATT/WTO member in year t and 0 otherwise; • Open it /Open vnt denotes the openness of country i/Vietnam in year t;
• Asean i is a dummy variable which is equal to one if country i is an ASEAN member;
• Inflation it /Inflation vnt is the inflation rate of county i/Vietnam in year t; Table 10 for information of further variables). Figure 3 shows the Kernel density estimate of BIT index in our whole sample across countries and across years. From this figure, we 14 could see that besides the relatively high density of value of 0 (meaning no BIT between Vietnam and a country at a year), a high density of BIT index value ranges from 0.2 to 0.8. 
Results
The first results of the heterogenous BIT effect on FDI inflows to Vietnam are shown in Table 5 . In all estimations, the identifier Id in the bottom of the tables refers to the individual identifier i-vn-t, for home country i, host country Vietnam and year t. The sample covers all 557 observations. The estimators for for two techniques of Fixed effect (FE) and Random effect (RE) for panel data are presented.
Results for BIT index
Baseline results
Baseline estimation results for the database of 557 observations are presented in this section. The basic variables are BIT index (BITindex ivnt ), Gross Domestic Products (Loggdp it và Loggdp vnt ), Distance between Vietnam and its partner -country i (Logdist ivn ) and Common Border dummies (Contig ivn ). Table 5 shows the estimation results applying two panel data techniques of Fixed effect -FE for the basic variables (Column (1), (3) and (5)) and Random effect -RE for the rests of Column (2), (4) and (6). We could see that there exist significant differences in coefficients of BIT index and Loggdp it with FE and RE. In addition, due to its own nature, RE-applying estimations show the coefficients of time-invariant variables such as See Appendix 3, Table 13 for the details). Hence, in the following sections of this paper, we will consider the RE-applying results for analysis.
The details for basic variables are as follows:
For BIT index (BITindex ivnt ), the results from Table 5 with RE techniques indicate that signing BIT does help Vietnam to raise its FDI inflows and more favorable BITs (with preferential articles) have higher positive impacts on FDI (at 1% significant level).
In particular, the increase in BIT index by 0.01 unit point leads to the rise of about 2.67%-3.05% ((Exp(1.3)-1) and (Exp(1.4)-1)) in FDI flows into Vietnam (for the BIT index, coefficients are of about 1.3-1.4).
For Loggdp it and Loggdp vnt (presenting for Market size), results for Random effect in Table 5 illustrate that as GDP from Vietnam, as well as its partner increases by 1%, Vietnam's FDI rises. However, the effect from the change in Vietnam's GDP is stronger than that in its partner's. As Vietnam's GDP rises by 1%, FDI into Vietnam boosts by 0.3 to 0.8%. As country i's GDP rises by 1%, FDI just goes up by 0.2 to 0.3%. These positive impacts are consistent with what are expected from gravity model. 15 As the market size of host country (like Vietnam) gets larger, more opportunities for sales and profits for enterprises will appear. That will attract investors, especially marketseeking ones. The sign, magnitude and significance level of Distance (Logdist iv ) indicate the negative effect of the change in distance between Vietnam and its partner on FDI inflows to Vietnam. If distance goes up by 1%, FDI reduces by 0.7-0.8%. This negative impact of distance is also consistent with gravity model. The increase in distance reflects the rise in transportation cost, discouraging investors in their investment activities. However, despite the above significant consistency of distance, the other variable representing for transportation cost such as common border (Contig) has no significant influence on FDI into Vietnam. This could be explained by the fact that not many partners included in the sample share common borders with Vietnam.
Openness with crisises, WTO, ASEAN membership
As mentioned in the literature review, one of the mechanisms that BIT could have an impact on FDI inflows is that BIT signing of a country gives investors signals for the country's openness with more favorable conditions (signaling effects). Hence, we want to see how will the effect of BIT on FDI inflows change as other open activities of Vietnam and its partners are considered. Those activities include crisises, World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and ASEAN membership.
Regarding crisises and economic shocks, these are proxied by Crisis variables (Crisis it và Crisis vnt ) and time dummies. As controlling for these effects in the baseline result table 6), it is clear that in RE equations, BIT index does have significantly positive impacts on FDI. For its own effect, the impact of crisis on FDI in Table 6 However, to make clearer the possible effect of this crisis, the authors also control for the dummy variable of the crisis 2008 for Vietnam (t2008 vn ) and its 1 and 2 year-delay (Lead1t2008 vn and Lead2t2008 vn ). The results in Table 6 , Columns (2)-(6) show positive impacts of these variables on FDI into Vietnam. They are also supported by dummies of _It_2008, _It_2009 and _It_2010 as well. Regarding WTO membership, openess in general and ASEAN membership, Table 7 indicates the fact that the positive effects of BIT don't change given these variable controlled. The magnitude of BITindex variable is much higher than other variables. At first, we could see from Column (1) is that WTO membership also helps to attract more FDI into the country. Meanwhile, the impact of BIT is even double than that of Vietnam's WTO membership. The explanation could be made is that while BIT with promotion and protection conditions directly covering investors' activities, WTO (despite its investment-related articles) focuses mainly on trade, leading to its smaller effect on FDI inflows to Vietnam. This effect of WTO is further supported by the time dummy of _It_2007 in the above Table 6 . Secondly, as looking at Openness in general, it is clearly indicated that like WTO's membership, openness does have positive effects on FDI (this affirms further the importance of market openness of a country to investors) but the magnitude is even much smaller than WTO membership and BIT. This proves further for the necessity of direct inclusion of investment-related regulations.
In contrast to WTO membership and Openness, ASEAN membership of Vietnam's partner (country i) has no significant effect on FDI. This could be explained by the fact that FDI from ASEAN countries is not as high as from outside-ASEAN countries.
Macroeconomic, Infrastructure and Institutional factors
Besides the case of controlling for openness, as other variables of macroeconomic, infrastructure and institution ones are considered, it could be seen from Appendix 3, However, if we look into the variable of Loggdp, especially for Vietnam, we could find out that the magnitudes of these are much higher than those in the cases without controlling for mentioned macroeconomic factors. Hence we could think that the fast growth of Vietnamese market during the consideration period captures all effects from macroeconomic perspectives.
About infrastructure, in our points of view, this is an important determinant reflecting host countries' supports for investors to reduce their costs and increase the possibility of receiving information. We use two different proxies for infrastructure, According to Appendix 3, Table 16 , two proxies of Telephone User Ratio for both
Vietnam and country i have a positive impact on FDI into Vietnam and that effect for
Vietnam is higher than that of country i (see Columns (1)). It could be interpreted that as telephone user ratio increases by 1% in country i/Vietnam, FDI will go up correspondently by 0.0258%/0.0856%. For Internet user ratio, the effect is quite clear for Vietnam's partner. For Vietnam, despite being statistically insignificant, the positive impact is also captured. These effects are consistent with what are expected. 16 They could be explained that the rise in telephone and internet user ratio make it easier for investors to do their transactions, reducing their transaction cost and encouraging them to invest more.
For looking deeply inside the institutional quality which is more and more important for investors, we indifferent proxies for institution such as: Political Stability (2), (4), (6), as these 3 proxies are controlled for, the coefficients for BIT index get a little higher.
New vs. Old BITs
To countries), the value of BIT index coefficient is 1.446, which is higher than that for whole sample, showing that signing BITs with countries do help Vietnam to increase its FDI inflows (In this sample, all partners with no BITs with Vietnam are excluded).
Secondly, for new members sample, the interested coefficient for BIT index is even higher than that for all members sample. The BIT index ranges from 0 (not signing BIT yet) to 1. Hence, the coefficient for this sample captures not only within-country effect of entering BITs, but also across-country effect of heterogeneous BITs. The impact for this new members sample could be even higher if the sample doesn't cover such a small number of partners (only 9 countries), 2 of which are quite small such as Lao and Cambodia. Finally, for old members sample covering 27 countries, the values of BIT index are higher than 0 for all observations during the consideration period, hence, the coefficient entirely captures the heterogeneous BIT impact on FDI. This result is very important and it is difficult to achieve if the dummy variable with two value of 0, 1 for BIT, rather than BIT index is applied here. We could realize that the value of the coefficient for this sample is much higher than that for all members and new members samples. In our point of view, these results support commitment effect through which investors in countries having BITs with Vietnam believe in the implementation of favorable articles by Vietnamese Government, hence, they will carry out further FDI activities. In addition, the above findings affirm further about the essence of looking at contents of various BITs and difference in favorable articles is very necessary for attracting FDI into Vietnam. Despite being considered in different ways, articles are quoted from being less to more favorable. Hence, we find that it is unnecessary to divide articles into 3 groups as initial targets. 17 Rather than that, we look at the effect of each article on FDI. As presented in Table 9 , while all articles have positive effects on FDI, only 3 of them are 17 The 3 groups which we intend to divide initially are ( The subject-matter of the investment agreement is determined by the definition of the term "investment" together with that of the "investor". The concept of investment governs the assets that fall under the scope of application of the agreement. In other words, it answers the question of what type of investments are covered. Traditionally aimed at investment protection, most BITs define "investment" in a broad and openended manner covering not only the capital that has crossed borders but also practically all other kinds of assets of an investor in the territory of the host country. However, a detailed observation shows that among BITs one can distinguish several kinds of definitions. Firstly, there is the traditional "asset-based" definition, which, with several variations, has continued to be the most common approach. Secondly, another definition, the use of which has diminished over the last years, is related to a "circular" or "tautological" approach, which focuses on the features of an investment rather than conceptualizing it. Thirdly, there is a "closed-list" definition of investment. Fourthly, there are techniques that exclude certain assets and transactions from the definition. We consider that techniques 1 and 2 provide with a broad definition of investment, whereas techniques 3 and 4 tend to narrow the definition of investment and hence automatically reduce the scope of application of the BIT. other countries that we reviewed use this technique.
Articles of BIT
Technique 3
Third approach that has emerged to avoid an excessively broad definition of "investment" is what is called a "closed-list" definition. It consists of an ample, but finite list of tangible and intangible assets as can be seen in the Vietnam-Bulgaria BIT.
Technique 4
The last technique excludes certain sectors from the definition of investment. Technique 4 and 1 can be combined as in the Vietnam-Mozambique BIT.
Admission vs. Establishment: Admission = 1, establishment = 2
Access limitations imposed on foreign investment have been justified on economic, social, political or national security grounds. BITs negotiation has evolved within this context, 2 models:
OPTION 1: One makes the admission/establishment subject to the domestic laws of the host country called the "admission clause" model
• "The right to be admitted" is entitled the host state, which frames its Model BIT with such admission provisions as "shall admit", "in accordance with local legislation".
• It allows the host country to apply any admission and screening mechanism for foreign investment that it may have in place and therefore to determine the conditions on which foreign investment will be allowed to enter the country 
Direct and Indirect Expropriation coverd: Yes=2; No=1
There are significant discrepancies in countries practices as some BITs will cover both direct and indirect expropriation while some will not address indirect expropriation. It is not a matter of national investment policies as some countries do not always cover indirect expropriation in their BITs. The choice is important as if indirect expropriation is covered by a treaty, it means that the BIT grant a protection to foreign investors who may be faced with serious alterations of the investment climate which they could not have reasonably anticipated.
Example:
Investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as "expropriation") in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose related to the internal needs of that Party on a non-discriminatory basis and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation. (BIT VN-UK)
Free transfer of investment-related funds: Yes=2; No=1
A broad guarantee to allow outward transfers is likely to attract FDI while exception to the principle have to be considered as being relatively less encouraging to FDI. Indeed, from the foreign investors' point of view, these clauses are key in investment-treaties, as the ability to freely repatriate funds can be an important factor in their investmentdecision process. Developing countries, on the other hand, often have an interest in not restraining their ability to adopt certain restrictive exchange rate or other measures, for instance, as means to prevent or confront economic and financial crises.
Yes = 2 means:
No Because BITs grant strong protection to investors of either state party who is operating in the territory of the other party they may impinge upon human rights enforcement and realization in several ways. Therefore, states may face conflicting international legal obligations under the two regimes. As a result a BIT without any such provision may be considered as having great impact on FDI flows whereas any provision in a BIT seeking to protect human rights, environment, etc. may be considered as having a lower impact…
Example:
The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by An investor State dispute mechanism is an incentive to invest because it provides as an ultimate resort access to international (neutral) jurisdiction. If such a mechanism is included in the BIT, it can be expected to have a positive effect on FDI flows, but if it is subject to conditions, the effect is expected to be less.
(NO: If there is requirement to resort to local remedies or local tribunals or courts as a condition to submit to international tribunal or court). Either the treaty protection is extended to investments made before the entry into force of the agreement, or the coverage is restricted to the future, which suggests that the effect is likely to be less positive. For this test, we can see that Prob>chi2=0. This means we reject the null H0 that all years coefficients are jointly equal. Due to such existence of not-jointly-equal-0, including time dummies are necessary. For this test, we can see that Prob>chibar2=0. This means we reject the null H0. In this case, Random Effect is better than simple regression of OLS. 
Umbrella clause
